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Daesh/IS Armored Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(AVBIEDs): Insurgent Use and Terrorism Potentials
This essay in the TRENDS terrorism futures series focuses on advanced threats related to vehicle
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). It provides a threat typology of these devices with
their evolution into the armored (AVBIED) variant that has now been fielded by Daesh/IS in both Iraq
and Syria. A short overview of such insurgent use will be provided as well as a brief discussion of
the terrorism potentials of such use if directed against the UAE, Europe, or the United States.

VBIED Threat Typology
Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), or simply vehicle bombs, have existed since
the September 1920 deployment of ‘Buda’s Wagon’—an actual horse drawn wagon filled with
explosives and scrap metal—at Wall and Broad streets in downtown Manhattan by the anarchist
Mario Buda. The attack left 40 dead and over 200 injured and, at the time, prompted a national
emergency in the US.[1]
This iteration of these weapons—dominated by car, van, and truck platforms—can be considered
Type 1 devices in the sense that they represent both a static and unarmored form of VBIED. Not
normally associated with suicide (or martyrdom) operations, because the driver does not have to
remain with the vehicle upon detonation, these devices have been used extensively throughout the
world, especially in the West. One concentration of such car bombings took place in both Northern
Ireland and in England from the 1970s through the 1990s. They were carried out by the Irish
Republication Army (IRA) in coordination with other forms of attacks utilizing thrown and emplaced
bombs, improvised mortars, incendiaries, and small arms. In the United States, the first World Trade
Towers Bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City Bombing that took place a few years later are
additional examples of the use of Type 1 VBIEDs. Multiple devices (e.g., secondary devices) are

typically utilized in a time delay mode which seeks to inflict casualties to responding forces by
detonating in likely command post and triage areas adjacent to the initial bombing or along expected
avenues of approach for emergency vehicles.
The next iteration of vehicular bombs—their Type 2 form—is derived from the mobile variant of
these unarmored devices. Their initial use by Shia militias and later Hezbollah became publicized
during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon and ongoing Israeli operations through 1985
as well as against US and French troops in 1983. VBIEDs were driven into the middle of Israeli
military convoys and then detonated—a major concern of US and allied forces in Iraq twenty years
later when the initial insurgency broke out against the Multinational Force (MNF) led by the U.S.
Type 2 VBIEDs were also utilized against high value targets during the Lebanon conflict when one
such device was deployed against the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, damaging the embassy
building and killing 63 personnel, and another was utilized in the October 1983 against the Marine
Barracks which leveled the building and killed 241 US servicemen.[2]
An even more sophisticated VBIED employment incident took place in Grozny, Chechnya in
December 2002, utilizing two vehicles working together in tandem. In this incident, perpetrated by
Riyadus-Salikhin and directed against the Chechen state Headquarters, two vehicles—one
purported to be driven by a 17-year old boy and the other driven by his father and 15-year old
sister—were utilized sequentially, with the first running down the perimeter fences and the second
one carrying the main explosive charge. The detonating 2nd VBIED destroyed the 4-story building
and caused 72 deaths and over 200 injuries.[3] This operation, masterminded by Shamil Basayev—
the infamous Islamist warlord and terrorist responsible for the 2004 Beslan school massacre—may
very well be considered an early firebreak TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) that later
groups would conceptually draw upon for their own VBIED attacks against heavily fortified
facilities.[4]

Chechen Government Headquarters Suicide Bombing, December 2002. Frame of the Attack from a
Propaganda Video. Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Brigade Social Media [For
Public Distribution]

The newest, or Type 3, VBIED iteration represents an advancement to the Type 2 form in that the
device is now not only mobile but also armored in order to increase its survival probability of
reaching the intended target. Terms for this armor application includes ‘hillbilly’ and ‘Mad Max’ armor
as well as the designation ‘heavy VBIED.’[5] These armored suicide bombing vehicles can be
utilized individually or in groups against secure compounds and high value infrastructure and are far
less vulnerable to defending fire than the earlier unarmored Type 2 variant. Rather than simply a
projected evolutional form of VBIED, these devices have now become a reality in insurgent
operational environments in the Middle East.

Insurgency Use
The use of AVBIEDs—and improvised armor placed on cars, trucks, and construction equipment for
armored fighting vehicle (AFV) purposes in general—in Iraq and Syria by Daesh/IS has been
discussed in quite a few articles and news reports, beginning in late 2013.[6] These vehicles run the
gamut from civilian vehicles and commercial trucks through bulldozers and dump trucks into actual
military vehicles such as captured armored HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles)[7] and M113 APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers).[8]

Daesh/IS AVBIED on Al Hawl Front, Northeastern Syria. Captured by Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastina
Gel (YPG), December 2015 Kurdish Social Media [For Public Distribution]

Explosives in the Bed of Daesh/IS AVBIED on Al Hawl Front, Northeastern Syria. Captured by
Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG), December 2015 Kurdish Social Media [For Public
Distribution]

The Daesh/IS has been utilizing AVBIEDs as a substitute for a lack of heavy artillery units and has
directed their use against garrisoned bases and towns in Iraq and Syria during breeching assaults
into them. Over the course of the last few years, AVBIED use has evolved to the point where they
have not only been used individually and in small groups but en masse, with thirty such vehicles
utilized during the capture of the Iraqi city of Ramadi in May 2015:
In the first wave, the jihadis packed a bulldozer with explosives, which then successfully obliterated a
security perimeter around an Iraqi government compound. Immediately after, about 30 vehicles
flooded into the then-contested city, setting off another series of massive explosions, according to
reports.
Ten of the thirty car bombs detonated resulted in such massive explosions that they packed enough
comparable firepower to the 1995 Oklahoma City truck bomb, ABC News reports.[9]
This refined TTP—reminiscent of the earlier Riyadus-Salikhin attack in Grozny—utilized an adhoc
collection of AVBIEDs including an armored bulldozer, at least one M113 APC, a number of armored
HMMWVs, as well as vehicles retrofitted with improvised armor appliques.[10] The attack resulted in

entire blocks of Ramadi being obliterated and, ultimately, the complete route of the defending Iraqi
troops from the city.

Armored HMMWV with Welded Ram/Plating and Rear Plating Used as VBIED. Utilized Against Shia
Military Base in Western Iraq in October 2015 Islamic State Social Media [For Public Distribution][11]

These ‘Franken-trucks,’ as some have labeled them, may even be getting more potentially bizarre
and high tech.[12] The capture of the recent Daesh/IS “jihadi university video,” which contains
information on a new driverless vehicle capability, may well represent another evolving variant of
future AVBIED use. As an outcome of this new capability, a suicide (e.g. martyrdom) driver is no
longer required to drive the vehicle into the intended target. Rather, a remote controlled steering,
accelerating, and braking system is utilized along with a mannequin rigged with thermal output
capability to mimic the heat signature given off by a human driver.[13] The intent here is to ‘spoof’
security service use of standoff thermal sensing equipment—that is, to make it register that a human
being is driving the vehicle—at key avenues of approach and facility access control check points.

Terrorism Potentials
To date, concerns in the UAE, Europe, and the United States have focused on unarmored VBIEDs.
While an ongoing and known threat capability exists concerning static car and truck bombs deployed
at choke and channeling points, it is their mobile use in attacking secure governmental and other
high value facilities that is of even greater concern. Various access control methods, ranging from
serpentine roadways through mobile road spikes and barriers, exist that will slow down or stop a
mobile VBIED attack. The follow-on response force protocol utilized in combination with such access
control measures is deadly small arms fire directed at the terrorist personnel that are driving the
threat vehicle as well as any supporting terrorist security forces.
The use of one or more armored VBIEDs drastically changes this defensive equation. In a minimum
access control scenario, a vehicle bombing attack may be slowed down enough for friendly forces to
engage the AVBIED but, given its probable ballistic protection levels, the effects of such deadly
response (comprised of semi-auto pistol though light assault rifle fires) will now be negated. In such
a scenario, the AVBIED has a much greater likelihood of reaching its intended detonation point than
a normal VBIED would be able to achieve. In a second scenario in which high levels of access
control measures exist, a singular IED carrying vehicle—even an armored one—would likely not
breech the initial barrier system. In this second scenario, now, however two or more AVBIEDs can
be deployed as has been witnessed in the many recent Daesh/IS AVBIED attacks in Syria and Iraq.
The first AVBIED penetrates as deeply as it can into a facility’s access control defense and then
detonates in place in order to clear a path for the next AVBIED to reach the mission’s intended
detonation point.[14]
Both of the above AVBIED scenarios suggest that, at a minimum, a reevaluation of both access
control protocols and responding force armaments needs to be conducted. Such a reevaluation
would determine if armored vehicles—such as executive SUVs (Sport Utility Vehicles) with ballistic
armor kits or more improvised systems as utilized by Daesh/IS in Iraq and Syria—should be
identified as a realistic threat to a specific facility and, as a result, if environmental design and
response planning considerations—including a provision for the acquisition of greater penetrative
weaponry such as 7.62 mm AP (Armor Piercing) or even .50 cal M82CQ Carbine-like systems for
driver compartment and engine block kill capability—should now be made.
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